SWIFT: Swarm Intelligence Driven ESL Synthesis for Functional Trojan Fortification

Abstract

This paper presents a novel Swarm Intelligence driven Electronic System-Level (ESL) synthesis-based security methodology for functional Trojan fortification (called 'SWIFT'). Backdoor functional Trojan covertly inserted in the reusable hardware designs is a major concern for ensuring reliability functionality of consumer electronics (CE) systems and also for ensuring consumer trust. Erroneous computed output due to malicious functional Trojan can cause malfunctioning of such reusable IP cores. Therefore, the proposed methodology introduces a framework that integrates triple modular redundancy (TMR) along with a unique multi-vendor allocation that enables the generation of Trojan fortified (resistant) reusable hardware intellectual property (IP) designs capable of countering functional Trojan, if present and producing the correct output. The proposed approach integrates the swarm intelligence-based design space exploration (DSE) process with Trojan fortification design process to optimize any possible design overhead incurred due to TMR design. Results of the experimental evaluation prove that the proposed approach can generate low-cost Trojan fortified IP designs at meagre exploration time and at the expense of nominal overhead compared to prior work (that handle Trojan detection only). Further, the presented approach can handle a several potential vulnerabilities in the DSP design, which shows its robust security strength. © 2024 IEEE.