A Critique of the Ability Hypothesis

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to formulate a criticism of the ability hypothesis (Lewis 1983, 1988) (Nemirow 1990, 2007), which itself has been forwarded as a criticism of the knowledge argument presented by Jackson (1982). I start by explicating the knowledge argument by discussing the import its premises have, followed by a brief discussion of some of the major objections raised against the knowledge argument. Thereafter, I discuss the ability hypothesis and the reason why it seems like a valid criticism to the knowledge argument. I further discuss in brief the major objections that have been raised against the ability hypothesis. In the penultimate section of the paper, I argue by making a case for ‘know-how-that’ that the analogy on which the ability hypothesis rests as a criticism to the knowledge argument does not hold. © 2025 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.